given or factical part of my self and, by acting on it, define who I am. I understand myself as being a student, a teacher, the lover of a specific person, or the follower or a specific cause. Thus the self defines itself by taking up its past by means of present actions that make sense in terms of its future. For Kierkegaard, then, the self can be understood as a temporal structure.
not discover a significance that is already there. There is no basis for this commitment in the cosmos. Indeed, such a commitment is exactly the opposite of belief in an objective truth. You are called by some concrete concern --either a person or a cause --and when you define yourself by your dedication to that concern, your world acquires seriousness, and significance.
The only way to have a meaningful life in the present age, then, is to let your involvement become definitive of reality for you, and what is definitive of reality for you is not something that is in any way provisional --although it certainly is vulnerable. That is why, once a society like ours becomes rational and reflective, such total commitments begin to look like a kind of dangerous dependency. The committed individual is identified as a workaholic or a woman who loves too much.
This suggests that to be recognized and appreciated individual commitment requires a shared understanding of what is worth pursuing. But as our culture comes more and more to celebrate critical detachment, self-sufficiency, and rational choice, there are fewer and fewer shared commitments. So, commitment itself beings to look like craziness.
Thus Heidegger comes to see the recent undermining of commitment as due not so much to a failure on the part of the individual, as to a lack of anything in the modern world that could solicit commitment from us and sustain us in it. The things that once evoked commitment --gods, heroes, the God-man, the acts of great statesmen, the words of great thinkers --have lost their authority. As a result, individuals feel isolated and alienated. They feel that their lives have no meaning because the public world contains no guidelines.
When everything that is material and social has become completely flat and drab, people retreat into their private experiences as the only remaining place to find significance. Heidegger sees this move to private experience as characteristic of the modern age. Art, religion, sex, education all becomes varieties of experiences. When all our concerns have been reduced to the common denominator of "experience" we will have reached the last stage of nihilism. One then sees "the plunge into frenzy and the disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive. The `lived experience' as such becomes decisive." 5 That is, when there are no shared examples of greatness that focus public concerns and elicit social commitment, people become spectators of fads and public lives, just for the excitement. When there are no religious practices that call forth sacrifice, terror, and awe, people consume everything from drugs to meditation practices to give themselves some kind of peak experience. The peak experience takes the place of what was once a relation to something outside the self that defined the real and was therefore holy. As Heidegger puts it:
[T]he loss of the gods is so far from excluding religiosity that rather only through that loss is the relation to the gods changed into mere "religious experience". (QCT 117, GA 5 76) Of course, private experience only seems attractive once the shared public world has lost its meaning and reality. Then one thinks (as if somehow it had always been the case and one had just discovered it) that, after all, it is the experience that matters. But sooner or later one finds that although private experience may have "energy" or "spontaneity" or "zing," it provides nothing in terms of which one can give consistency, meaning, and seriousness to one's life. 6 In Nietzsche's words, "God is Dead, and we have killed him".
Nietzsche, however, unlike Heidegger, finds the death of God liberating. He foresees a new stage of our culture that he calls "positive nihilism," in which each "free spirit" will posit, i.e., create, his or her own values. Heidegger is not so sanguine. He sets out to investigate the history of the understanding of being in the West in order to understand how we did the terrible deed of killing God. One way he tells the story of the loss of meaning is by tracing the history of the very idea of values taken over uncritically by Nietzsche. Heidegger argues that to think of nihilism as a state in which we have forgotten or betrayed our values is part of the problem. Thinking that we once had values but that we do not have values now, and that we should regain our values or choose new ones, is just another symptom of the trouble. Heidegger claims that thinking about our deepest concerns as values is nihilism.
The essence of a value is that it is something that is completely independent of us. It is perceived, and then chosen or rejected. Values have an interesting history.
Plato starts with the claim that they are what shows us what is good for us independent of our interests and desires. The idea of the good shines on us and draws us to it. Only with the enlightenment do we arrive at the notion that values are objective --passive objects standing over against us --and we must choose our values. These values have no claim on us until we decide which ones we want to adopt. Once we get the idea that there is a plurality of values and that we choose which ones will have a claim on us, we are ripe for the modern idea, first found in the works of Nietzsche, especially in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that we posit our values --that is, that valuing is something we do and value is the result of doing it.
But once we see that we posit values, we also see that we can equally "unposit" them.
They thus lose all authority for us. So, far from giving meaning to our lives, thinking of what is important to us in terms of values shows us that our lives have no intrinsic meaning. As long as we think in terms of explicit value-objects rather than being gripped by shared concerns, we will not find anything that elicits our commitment.
As Heidegger says, "No one dies for mere values." (QCT 142, GA 5 102)
Once we see how thinking of the problem of nihilism in terms of lacking values perpetuates rather than combats the problem, we are ready to diagnose and seek a cure for our condition. According to Heidegger our trouble begins with
Socrates' and Plato's claim that true moral knowledge, like scientific knowledge, must be explicit and disinterested. Heidegger questions both the possibility and the desirability of making our everyday understanding totally explicit. He introduces the idea that the shared everyday skills, concerns, and practices into which we are socialized provide the conditions necessary for people to make sense of the world and of their lives. All intelligibility presupposes something that cannot be fully articulated --a kind of knowing-how rather than a knowing-that. At the deepest level such knowing is embodied in our social skills rather than in our concepts, beliefs, and values. Heidegger argues that our cultural practices can direct our activities and make our lives meaningful only insofar as they are and stay unarticulated, that is, as long as they stay the soil out of which we live. If there is to be seriousness it must draw on these unarticulated background practices. As Heidegger puts it in a later work, "Every decision ... bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision."(OWA 55) 7 Critical reflection is necessary in some situations where our ordinary way of coping is insufficient, but such reflection cannot and should not play the central role it has played in the philosophical tradition. What is most important and meaningful in our lives is not and should not be accessible to critical reflection. For everyday practices to give meaning to our lives and to unite us in a community, they must be focused and held up to the practitioners. Clifford Geertz and Charles Taylor have each discussed this important phenomenon. In describing the role of the cockfight in Balinese society, Geertz points out:
[I]t provides a metasocial commentary upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then organizing the major part of collective existence around that assortment. Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves. 9 Heidegger calls this interpretive function, "truth setting itself to work", and anything that performs this function he calls a work of art. As his illustration of an artwork working, Heidegger takes the Greek temple. The temple held up to the Greeks what was important, and so let there be meaningful differences such a victory and disgrace, disaster and blessing.
It is the templework that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of The Greeks whose practices were manifested and focused by the temple lived in a moral space that gave direction and meaning to their lives. In the same way, the Medieval cathedral made it possible to be sinner or a saint and showed Christians the dimensions of salvation and damnation. 10 In Quartets, still lifes, and cockfights are not merely reflections of a pre-existing sensibility analogically represented; they are positive agents in the creation and maintenance of ... sensibility.
12
Charles Taylor makes the same point when he distinguished shared meanings which he calls inter-subjective meanings, from common meanings "whose being shared is a collective act." He continues:
[I]t is part of the meaning of a common aspiration, belief, celebration, etc. that it be not just shared but part of the common reference world. Or to put it another way, its being shared is a collective act. ... Common meanings are the basis of community. Inter-subjective meanings gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meaning does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These are objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes community. 13 In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn shows that
scientists engaged in what he calls normal science operate in terms of such an exemplar or paradigm --an outstanding example of a good piece of work. The paradigm for modern science was Newton's Principia. All agreed that Newton had seen exemplary problems, given exemplary solutions, and produced exemplary justifications for his claims. Thus, for over two centuries natural scientists knew that, insofar as their work resembled Newton's, they were doing good science.
The Newtonian paradigm was later replaced by the Einsteinian paradigm. Such a paradigm shift constitutes a scientific revolution. After such a revolution scientists see and do things differently. As Kuhn puts it, they work in a different world. They also believe and value different things, but this is less important. Kuhn is quite
Heideggerian in holding that it is the paradigm that guides the scientists' practices and that the paradigm cannot be explained as a set of beliefs or values and so cannot be stated as a criterion or rule. At a time of a scientific revolution, however, Kuhn tells us, the paradigm becomes the focus of conflicting interpretations, each trying to rationalize and justify it. Similarly, Heidegger holds that a working artwork is so important to a community that people must try to make the work clear and coherent and to make everyone follow it in all aspects of their lives. But the artwork, like the scientific paradigm, exhibits a resistance to such rationalization. Any paradigm could be paraphrased and rationalized only if the concrete thing which served as an exemplar symbolized or represented an underlying system of beliefs or values abstracted from the particular exemplar. But the whole point of needing an exemplar is that there is no such system, there are only shared practices. Heidegger calls the way the artwork solicits the culture to make the artwork explicit, coherent and encompassing the world aspect of the work. He calls the way the artwork and its associated practices resist such totalization, the earth.
Heidegger points out that world and earth are both necessary for an artwork to work. The temple must clarify and unify the practices --it must be "all governing" --but being a concrete thing it resists rationalization. Such resistance is manifest in the very materiality of the artwork. Such materiality is not accidental. The temple requires the stone out of which it is made in order to do its job of showing man's place in the natural world, so that a temple made out of steel would not work. One can recognize an allusion to the covenant of God with the Jews and the Crucifixion, and also the political act that founds a state. For example the American constitution, like a work of art, has necessarily become the focus of attempts to make it explicit and consistent and to make it apply to all situations and, of course, it is fecond just in so far as it can never be interpreted once and for all. The founding of a state could, of course, also refer to the act of a charismatic leader such as Hitler. This possibility will concern us later in this essay.
III. Technology
Cultural paradigms do not, however, always establish meaningful differences.
There In this address he also laments the appearance of television antennaes on the peasants' dwellings, and gives his own version of an attack on the levelling power of the media.
Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. ... All that with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail, and drive man --all that is already much closer to man today than his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the earth, closer than the change from night to day, closer that the conventions and customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world. (DOT 50, G 17)
Such quotes make it seem Heidegger is a ludite who would like to return from consumerism, the exploitation of the earth, and mass media to the world of the preSocratic Greeks or the good old Schwarzwald peasants.
Nevertheless, although Heidegger does not deny that technology presents us with serious problems, as his thinking develops he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that focusing on loss and destruction is still technological. Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering.
Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing-reserve. (QCT 17, VA 24)
No more do we have subjects turning nature into an object of exploitation:
The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational,"
i.e., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. (QCT 173, VA 61)
Heidegger concludes: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object." (QCT 17, VA 24) He tells us that a modern airliner, understood in its technological essence, is not a tool we use; it is not an object at all, but rather a flexible and efficient cog in the transportation system. Likewise, we are not subjects who use the transportation system, but rather we are used by it to fill the planes.
In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving God, society, our fellow men, or even ourselves no longer make sense. Human beings, on this view, become a resource to be used --but more importantly, to be enhanced --like any other.
Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process. in touch with our current understanding of being. We pursue the development of our potential simply for the sake of further growth. We have no specific goals. The human potential movement perfectly expresses this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better organize the future use of our natural resources.
We thus become part of a system which no one directs but which moves towards the total mobilization and enhancement of all beings, even us. This is why Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare of all is not the solution of our problems but the culmination of the technological understanding of being.
Heidegger, however, sees that "it would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances."(DOT 53, G 24) Instead, Heidegger suggests that there is a way we can keep our technological
devices and yet remain true to ourselves as receivers of clearings:
We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.
(DOT 54, G 24-25)
To understand how this might be possible, we need an illustration of Heidegger's important distinction between technology and the technological understanding of being. Again we can turn to Japan. In contemporary Japan traditional, nontechnological practices still exist alongside the most advanced high-tech production and consumption. The TV set and the household gods share the same shelf --the styrofoam cup co-exists with the porcelain tea cup. We thus see that the Japanese at least, can enjoy technology without taking over the technological understanding of being.
For us to be able to make a similar dissociation, Heidegger holds, we must rethink the history of being in the West. Then we will see that although a technological understanding of being is our destiny, it is not our fate. That is, although our understanding of things and ourselves as resources to be ordered, enhanced, and used efficiently has been building up since Plato, we are not stuck with that understanding. Although the technological understanding of being governs the way things have to show up for us, we can hope for a transformation of our current cultural clearing.
Only those who think of Heidegger as opposing technology will be surprised at his next point. Once we see that technology is our latest understanding of being, we will be grateful for it. This clearing is the cause of our distress, yet if it were not given to us to encounter things and ourselves as resources, nothing would show up as anything at all, and no possibilities for action would make sense. And once we realize --in our practices, of course, not just as matter of reflection --that we receive our technological understanding of being, we have stepped out of the technological understanding of being, for we then see that what is most important in our lives is not subject to efficient enhancement --indeed, the drive to control everything is precisely what we do not control. This transformation in our sense of reality --this overcoming of thinking in terms of values and calculation --is precisely what Heideggerian thinking seeks to bring about. Heidegger seeks to make us see that our practices are needed as the place where an understanding of being can establish itself, so we can overcome our restricted modern clearing by acknowledging our essential receptivity to understandings of being.
[M]odern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence. That essential space of man's essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself ... that is the way in which the safekeeping of being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by being. (QCT 39, TK 39)
This transformation in our understanding of being, unlike the slow process of cleaning up the environment, which is, of course, also necessary, would take place in a sudden gestalt switch.
The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of being suddenly clears itself and lights up. (QCT
44, TK 43)
The danger --namely that we have a leveled and concealed understanding of being --when grasped as the danger, becomes that which saves us.
The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power. (QCT 39,
This remarkable claim gives rise to two opposed ways of understanding
Heidegger's response to technology. Both interpretations agree that once one recognizes the technological understanding of being for what it is --an historical understanding --one gains a free relation to it. We neither push forward technological efficiency as our sole goal nor always resist it. If we are free of the technological imperative we can, in each case, discuss the pros and cons. As
Heidegger puts it:
We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, ... as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses "yes" and at the same time "no", by an old word, releasement towards things. 16 (DOT 54, G 25)
One natural way of understanding this proposal holds that once we get in the right relation to technology, viz. recognize it as a clearing, it is revealed as just as good as any other clearing. 17 Efficiency --getting the most out of ourselves and everything else, "being all you can be" --is fine, as long as we see that efficiency for its own sake is not the only end for man, dictated by reality itself, but is just our When we then look back at the preceding remark, we realize releasement gives only a "possibility" and a "promise" of "dwelling in the world in a totally different way", it
does not yet enable us to do so. Mere openness to technology leaves out much that To begin with Heidegger holds that we must learn to appreciate marginal
practices --what Heidegger calls the saving power of insignificant things --practices such as friendship, backpacking into the wilderness, and drinking the local wine with friends. All these practices remain marginal precisely because they resist efficiency.
These practices can, of course, also be engaged in for the sake of health and greater efficiency. Indeed, the greatest danger is that even the marginal practices will be mobilized as resources. We must therefore protect these endangered practices. But helps us understand that we must foster human receptivity and preserve the endangered species of pre-technological practices that remain in our culture, in the hope that one day they will be pulled together in a new paradigm, rich enough and resistant enough to give a new meaningful direction to our lives.
IV. Politics
Heidegger's political engagement was predicated upon his interpretation of the Moreover, Heidegger sees no hope of overcoming nihilism if one accepts the Kantian ideal of rational autonomy central to the Enlightenment. In fact, he sees autonomy as the cause of our dangerous contemporary condition. He counters the Enlightenment with a non-theological version of the Christian message that man cannot be saved by autonomy, maturity, equality, and dignity alone. Heidegger holds that only some shared meaningful concern that grips us can give our culture a focus and enable us to resist acquiescence to a state that has no higher goal than to provide material welfare for all. This conviction underlies his dangerous claim that only a god --a charismatic figure or some other culturally renewing event --can save us from nihilism.
To many, however, the idea of a god which will give us a unified but open community --one set of concerns which everyone shares if only as a focus of disagreement --sounds either unrealistic or dangerous. Heidegger would probably
agree that its open democratic version looks increasingly unobtainable and that we have certainly seen that its closed totalitarian form can be very dangerous. But
Heidegger holds that given our historical essence --the kind of beings we became in fifth century BC Greece when our culture gained its identity --such a community is necessary to us or else we will remain in nihilism. It is, he thinks, our only hope, or, as he puts it, our destiny.
It follows for Heidegger that our deepest needs will be satisfied and our distress overcome only when our culture gets a new center. Our current condition is defined by the absence of a god:
The era is defined by the god's failure to arrive, by the "default of god. Heidegger's personal mistake comes from having thought that Hitler or National Socialism was such a god. Yet, Heidegger had already, in "The Origin of the Work of Art," developed criteria that could serve to determine whether a charismatic leader or movement deserved our allegiance. He stresses there that a true work of art must set up a struggle between earth and world. That is, a true work of art does not make everything explicit and systematic. It generates and supports resistance to total mobilization. Yet, Heidegger chose to support a totalitarian leader who denied the truth of all conflicting views and was dedicated to bringing everything under control.
Heidegger no doubt interpreted Hitler as setting up some sort of appropriate struggle.
Unfortunately, there is no interpretation-free criterion for testing a new god, and such mistakes are always possible. Heidegger's philosophy, then, is dangerous because it seeks to convince us that only a god -a charismatic figure or some other culturally renewing event --can save us from falling into contented nihilism. It exposes us to the risk of committing ourselves to some demonic renewing event or movement.
What sort of claim is Heidegger making when he tells us that enlightenment welfare and dignity are not enough and that only a god can save us? How can one justify or criticize Heidegger when he reads our current condition as the absence of god and our current distress as a sign of the greatest danger? --for only such a reading of the present age justifies risking commitment to some new cultural paradigm.
The first answer we might try to give is that Heidegger is offering a genealogical interpretation. He will focus on and augment our distress and show that it can be accounted for by telling a story of the progressive narrowing, levelling, and totalizing of the West's understanding of being. Such an interpretation has to make sense of more details of our history and present situation than any rival interpretation, and ultimately it must convince us by the illumination it casts on our current condition, especially on our sense of ontological distress or emptiness, if we have one.
But how could we know that our distress was due to the absence of a god rather than personal and social problems? One answer might be that we will just have to wait for the perfected welfare state and then see how we feel. If defenders of the Enlightenment are right, distress will be eliminated, whereas Heidegger, one might suppose, would expect that, as technology succeeds, the suffering will grow. But
Heidegger does not makes this claim. Heidegger admits and fears the possibility that everyone might simply become healthy and happy, and forget completely that they are receivers of understandings of being. All Heidegger can say is that such a forgetting of our forgetting of being would be the darkest night of nihilism. In such an "unworld" Heidegger could not longer expect to be understood. Only now, and only as long as he can awaken our distress, and our sense of our receptivity to a mysterious source of meaning that creates and sustains us, can he hope that we will be able to see the force of his interpretation. 
